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Abstract
It is generally understood that the 2007- 2009 recession in the United States had its roots in the real estate
market. To quote Schiller (2008): “a speculative bubble in the housing market (...) has now caused ruptures
among many other countries in the form of financial failures and a global credit crunch” (p. 1). There is a
growing body of literature on the economic impact of the bursting of this “speculative bubble”. Efforts have
been directed at examining how financial institutions have been impacted and at considering different efforts
to re-regulate this industry. As the economic recovery from this particular recession has been slower than after
previous contractions, particularly in terms of job creation, research efforts have also focused on labor
markets. In this paper, we examine the interplay between financial and labor market factors and the real estate
market at the local level. We study McLean County, Illinois, since this county, while being the largest in the
state in terms of square mileage, has a median income level and a home ownership rate comparable to those of
Cook County –where the City of Chicago is located.
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FINANCIAL AND LABOR MARKET 
DETERMINANTS OF MORTGAGE DELINQUEN-
CY RATES: MCLEAN COUNTY, IL, 1985-2011
Jake Mann
I. INTRODUCTION
 It is generally understood that the 2007-
2009 recession in the United States had its roots 
in the real estate market. To quote Schiller (2008): 
“a speculative bubble in the housing market (...) 
has now caused ruptures among many other 
countries in the form of financial failures and a 
global credit crunch” (p. 1). There is a growing 
body of literature on the economic impact of the 
bursting of this “speculative bubble”. Efforts have 
been directed at examining how financial institu-
tions have been impacted and at considering 
different efforts to re-regulate this industry. As the 
economic recovery from this particular recession 
has been slower than after previous contractions, 
particularly in terms of job creation, research ef-
forts have also focused on labor markets. In this 
paper, we examine the interplay between finan-
cial and labor market factors and the real estate 
market at the local level. We study McLean Coun-
ty, Illinois, since this county, while being the larg-
est in the state in terms of square mileage, has a 
median income level and a home ownership rate 
comparable to those of Cook County –where the 
City of Chicago is located.
 As Marcano and Ruprah (2011) report, re-
cent economic literature tends to cast the phe-
nomenon of mortgage default, the precursor to 
potential property foreclosure, as either an issue of 
moral hazard or as an issue of inability to pay. Re-
garding the issue of moral hazard and mortgage 
defaults significant attention has been devoted to 
the study of why and when homeowners choose 
to stop making their monthly mortgage pay-
ments. The premise that homeowners will “walk 
away” from their properties when the value of the 
mortgage is greater than the home price, a situa-
tion known as having “negative equity” or being 
“underwater”, fits a crude cost-benefit analysis of 
such a situation. Yet, Foote et al. (2008) find that 
“contrary to popular belief, […] negative equity is 
a necessary but not a sufficient condition for fore-
closure” (p. 1). In fact, they report that fewer than 
10 percent of homeowners experiencing nega-
tive equity on their homes eventually experience 
foreclosure. Moreover, Mian and Sufi (2008) place 
the onus of foreclosures on the lenders, as “the ex-
pansion in the supply of credit driven by disinter-
mediation is responsible for the rapid increase in 
new loan originations, house price appreciation, 
and subsequent large increase in default rates” 
(p. 4). Similar conclusions regarding lending stan-
dards and mortgage securitization are reached 
by Nadauld and Sherlund (2009), Haughwout et 
al. (2008), and Keys et al. (2008). The prevalence 
of adjustable-rate mortgage instruments during 
the build-up of the housing bubble also played a 
central factor in the buildup of negative equity. 
As Bucks et al. (2008) point out, borrowers with 
adjustable-rate mortgages were much more like-
ly to misunderstand the terms of their mortgage 
contract than their peers. Particularly, they were 
“likely to underestimate or to not know how much 
their interest rates could change” (p. 1).
 Regarding the issue of inability to pay and 
mortgage defaults research efforts have been 
focused on identifying the factors that prevent 
the homeowners from making their monthly pay-
ments. Such factors can be broadly categorized 
as either financial (e.g. interest rates on the mort-
gaged principal) or labor-market related (e.g. 
the employment status of the homeowner). Previ-
ous real estate market crises informed the work 
of Campbell and Dietrich (1983) and Deboer 
and Conrad (1988), who found that unemploy-
ment rates are positively related to mortgage 
and property tax delinquency levels respectively. 
More recently, Mayer et al. (2009) find that “In ar-
eas with widespread increases in unemployment, 
house prices generally decline; demand for hous-
ing falls as income drops and workers migrate to 
other areas in search of jobs” (p. 42). Financial 
factors have also been considered. Gerardi et al. 
(2007) estimation results indicate that the short-
term London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and 
unemployment rate are positively associated with 
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foreclosure levels. Also, Demyanyk and Van Hem-
ert (2009) find that at the outset of the 2006-2007 
housing crisis the delinquency rate on fixed-rate 
mortgages actually fell and that the ‘variable’ 
delinquency rate rose enough to cause a cu-
mulative increase in the aggregate delinquency 
rate.
 We focus our study on the arguments re-
lated to the inability to pay, rather than on the 
moral hazard argument, in order to address an 
ongoing public policy argument: whether mort-
gage defaults are more strongly influenced by 
the weakness in the labor market or by the actual 
costs of financing the mortgages. The policy im-
plications of this argument are enormous. If the 
costs of mortgages are found to be more relevant 
than, let’s say, the unemployment rate in explain-
ing mortgage defaults, policy efforts should be 
focused on facilitating debt re-financing; if the in-
verse is true, policy efforts should prioritize job-cre-
ation to stem the mortgage defaults and foreclo-
sures. Cordell et al. (2008) offer their own answer 
to this question when reporting that the “dead-
weight losses” derived from foreclosures could be 
reduced with “loss mitigation” (i.e. re-financing).
 We expect that an increase in either fixed 
or variable interest rates decreases homeowners’ 
ability to make their mortgage payments, thus in-
creasing delinquency rates. Changes in fixed and 
variable mortgage interest rates should impact 
homeowners in slightly different ways. A change 
in the fixed interest rate will only affect newly 
granted fixed-rate mortgages for either the ac-
quisition of a new house or for the refinancing of 
the current one. Homeowners already locked-in 
with a fixed rate and not looking into re-financing 
would not be affected. A change in the variable 
interest rate, however, affects the current cost of 
financing a house purchase financed through a 
variable interest instrument. We also expect that 
a deterioration of the general condition of the lo-
cal labor market decreases homeowners’ ability 
to make their mortgage payments, thus increas-
ing delinquency rates. An increase in the local un-
employment rate would signal a decrease in the 
current average income from labor.
 We focus our study on the McLean Coun-
ty housing market because it could be represen-
tative of statewide trends. With a population of 
nearly 170,000 residents, mostly concentrated in 
the adjacent City of Bloomington and Town of 
Normal, nearly 275,000 mortgage deeds have 
been granted over the past 26 years. During most 
of our period of analysis, 1985-2011, the mortgage 
delinquency rate has wandered around a mean 
value of 2.00 percent; yet starting in 2005 it began 
to grow, peaking at a value above 9.00 percent 
in 2010. The metropolitan unemployment rate has 
also been increasing and the regional mortgage 
financing costs have been at, or above, national 
averages. As mentioned above, the County has 
a housing market fairly representative of the rest 
of the state. To begin with, it contains well defined 
and distinct urban and a rural “submarkets”. Also, 
the county’s average population per household 
(2.46) and homeownership rate (67.70 percent) 
are within a five percent margin of the national 
average values.
 The remainder of this paper is organized as 
follows: Section 2 describes the data and meth-
odology, examining the stationarity of the series; 
Section 3 identifies the best-fitting linear regres-
sions used to examine the behavior of mortgage 
delinquency rates, discussing our findings; lastly, 
Section 4 presents conclusions and outlines policy 
implications.
II. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
 In McLean County, mortgage delinquen-
cies are registered through the issuances of a lis 
pendens, which are notices informing the grantee 
of a mortgage that the grantor’s payments are 
90 days past due. These notices are filed with the 
County’s Recorder’s Office and are accessible 
through an online database. By dividing the num-
ber of lis pendens filings by the total number of 
mortgage deeds issued, the monthly delinquen-
cy rate is computed. Our sample period starts in 
January 1985 and ends in December 2011: a total 
of 310 observations. Our sample period contains 
a total of 274,310 mortgage deeds and 5,887 lis 
pendens, resulting in an average delinquency 
rate of 2.15 percent. As seen in Figure 1 on the 
next page, the series displays a period of rela-
tive stability between 1985 and 2004, when the 
monthly delinquency rate oscillates between 1.50 
and 2.00 percent. The evolution of the twelve-
month moving average of the mortgage delin-
quency rate suggests a change in the long-term 
trend by the end of 2005.
 National interest rates are obtained from 
the FRED database maintained by the St. Louis 
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Federal Reserve Bank. These rates represent an 
average of the borrowing costs in the United 
States. Regional interest rates are obtained from 
the primary Mortgage Market Survey conducted 
by the federal agency Freddie Mac. These rates 
represent borrowing costs within the North Cen-
tral region, comprised of the states of Illinois, Ohio, 
Indiana, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, 
North Dakota and South Dakota. We compile 
both the 30-Year Fixed Rate Mortgage Average 
and the 1-Year Adjustable Rate Average. Figure 
2 compares national and regional fixed interest 
rates. Figure 3 compares national and regional 
variable rates. In both cases, secular declining 
trends are easily observable. Although the fixed 
rate is generally higher than the variable rate, this 
difference has ebbed and flowed dramatically in 
the last decade. In fact, during the most recent 
recession both rates were effectively identical. 
In our sample period regional fixed interest rates 
have been an average of 0.06 percentage points 
above the national value. Similarly, regional vari-
able interest rates have exceeded national val-
ues by an average of 0.15 percent. In December 
2011, the end of our sample, the national fixed 
rate rested at 3.96 percent while the national vari-
able rate was 2.79 percent. In this same month, 
the regional fixed rate was 3.97 percent while the 
regional variable rate was 3.06 percent.
 Labor market indicators for McLean 
County are obtained from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics’ Metropolitan Area Survey. The compiled 
series, the unemployment rate and the number of 
unemployed workers, display similar cyclical be-
havior. Figure 4 and Figure 5 show that both labor 
market indicators declined between 1990 and 
2000, with the unemployment rate reaching a 
low of 2.2 percent in 1998. Increasing, afterward, 
the unemployment rate peaked at 5.2 percent 
in 2005 before declining once again –this time to 
3.9 percent in 2007. The latest nation-wide eco-
nomic contraction has brought the county-level 
unemployment rate to its highest in 20 years: 9.1 
percent.
 In order to determine what structural re-
lationship may link financial and labor market 
variables with the mortgage delinquency rate, 
we will estimate several linear regression models 
through Ordinary Least Squares. First, we will study 
the impact of labor and financial variables on 
the mortgage delinquency rate separately and 
then we will combine them into a single regression 
equation. The first step in our model-building effort 
is to determine the order of integration of each 
series: if a series is integrated of order zero, I(0), it 
follows that it is stationary in levels.  We compute 
the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test statistic 
to determine the presence of a unit root in the 
series. Following econometric convention, we first 
compute the natural logarithmic value of the se-
ries in order to induce linearity.  Table 1 reports the 
results of the ADF tests of the variables in log-levels 
(top section) and in first-order differences of the 
log-levels (bottom section). Except in the case of 
the mortgage delinquency rate we fail to reject 
the null hypothesis that any of the series in log-
levels has a unit root within a 95 percent confi-
dence interval. We will put forward the argument 
that the pseudo-stationary behavior of the mort-
gage delinquency rate between 1985 and 2005 
influences the value of the ADF test statistic for the 
whole sample period. When the first-order differ-
ences of the log-level values are considered the 
reported ADF test statistics strongly reject the null 
hypothesis of the presence of a unit root in any of 
the series. Thus, we conclude that all the series are 
integrated of order one, I(1), and that they should 
be incorporated into our subsequent regression 
efforts in terms of growth rates. 
 In order to check the robustness of our 
findings we also compute the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-
Schmidt-Shim (KPSS) test statistic to directly ascer-
tain the potential stationarity of the series. Table 
2 reports the results of the KPSS tests of the vari-
ables in log-levels (top section) and in first-order 
differences of the log-levels (bottom section). In 
the case of the mortgage delinquency rate and 
the labor market indicators we strongly reject the 
null hypothesis that, in log-levels, these series are 
stationary; in the case of the financial market in-
dicators we fail to reject the null hypothesis of sta-
tionarity within a 95 percent confidence interval. 
When the first-order differences of the log-level 
values are considered the reported KPSS test sta-
tistics allow us not to reject the null hypothesis of 
stationarity for all the series. As above, we con-
clude that all the series are integrated of order 
one, I(1), and that they should be incorporated 
into our subsequent regression efforts in terms of 
growth rates.
III. ESTIMATION RESULTS
 We now turn to estimating a structural 
model of county-level mortgage delinquency 
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rates as a function of labor and financial market 
factors. We study each of these sets of factors 
separately and then combine them in order to 
present the best-fitting linear regression model. We 
employ an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method-
ology to estimate the parameters of these families 
of models. 
 Our first set of estimating equations relates 
the mortgage delinquency rate with labor market 
factors. Besides the growth rate in the number of 
unemployed workers and the growth rate in the 
unemployment rate we considered the growth 
rate in the number of employed workers as a po-
tential explanatory variable. Because none of 
our estimation formulations including this last vari-
able yielded any significant result we chose not 
to include this equation in our discussion of results. 
Table 3 presents the estimation results of Model A 
and Model B. In both models we incorporate a 
lagged (t-1) value of the dependent variable as 
an independent variable in order to capture the 
concept of persistence in the behavior of mort-
gage delinquency rates. The regression parame-
ter associated with this variable is highly significant 
and almost identical across model specifications. 
Its negative sign indicates that an increase (de-
crease) in the mortgage delinquency rate during 
any given month is followed the next month by a 
decrease (increase) in the mortgage delinquen-
cy rate. For example, when the mortgage delin-
quency rate increases by 10 percent during the 
previous month we should expect a 3.63 (on aver-
age) percentage decrease in its value this month. 
Thus, the mortgage delinquency rate does not 
increase continually. We also include a dummy 
variable in order to capture an abnormally large 
drop in the value of the mortgage delinquency 
rate during the early months of 1992: during the 
first quarter of the year the number of recorded lis 
pendens notices was less than three a month. We 
attribute these low values to either a clerical issue 
related to the recording the notices or to a pos-
sible change in the legal process regarding the 
issuing of a lis pendens notice itself. The param-
eter associated with this dummy variable is highly 
significant and, as should be expected, negative 
in sign.
 Model A examines the relationship be-
tween the county-level mortgage delinquency 
rate and the metropolitan area unemployment 
rate. Due to the delay between the time a home-
owner becomes unemployed and the time a 
mortgage is considered to be in default – recall 
that in the State of Illinois a mortgage is in default 
after 90 days of non-payment – we lag this vari-
able by four (4) periods. The regression parameter 
associated with this variable is highly significant 
and positive in sign. We find that a one percent 
increase (decrease) in the unemployment rate 
four months ago translates into a 0.70 percent in-
crease (decrease) in the mortgage delinquency 
rate during the current month. Lastly, Model B 
examines the relationship between the county-
level mortgage delinquency rate and the metro-
politan area number of unemployed individuals. 
For the same reasons discussed above, we lag 
this variable by four (4) periods. The regression 
parameter associated with this variable is highly 
significant and positive in sign. We find that a one 
percent increase (decrease) in the number of 
unemployed individuals four months ago trans-
lates into a 0.76 percent increase (decrease) in 
the mortgage delinquency rate during the cur-
rent month. We hypothesize that a change in 
the number of unemployed workers has a larger 
impact on the mortgage delinquency rate than 
a change in the unemployment rate due to the 
structure of the local labor market. Due to the lim-
ited range of horizontal mobility in terms of poten-
tial employers in the county we expect that when 
a worker becomes unemployed she or he leaves 
the area in order to become occupied in a similar 
activity. Thus, when the actual number of unem-
ployed workers residing in the area increases, its 
impact on mortgage delinquency rates is larger 
than that of an identical increase in the area un-
employment rate. The explanatory power of our 
linear regression efforts focused on labor market 
factors yield very similar R-squares: we explain (on 
average) 23 percent of the variance in the rate 
of growth of the delinquency rate. The residual 
diagnostics yield mixed results. Although we can 
strongly reject the null hypothesis of heteroske-
dasticity in the residuals, we cannot conclude 
definitely that the regression residuals are not au-
tocorrelated or that they are normally distributed.
Our second set of estimating equations relates 
the mortgage delinquency rate with national and 
regional financial market factors.  Table 4 presents 
the estimation results of Model C and Model D. As 
before, in both models we incorporate a lagged 
(t-1) value of the dependent variable as an in-
dependent variable in order to capture the con-
cept of persistence in the behavior of mortgage 
delinquency rates. Our findings are almost identi-
cal to those presented above and we will refer 
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the reader to that section of the paper in order to 
economize space. The dummy variable discussed 
above is also incorporated in these models.
 Model C examines the relationship be-
tween the county-level mortgage delinquency 
rate and national-level fixed and variable interest 
rates. Due to the delay between the time fixed 
interest rates change and the time a homeowner 
notices changes in her or his potential mortgage 
financing costs we lag this variable by two (2) 
periods. The regression parameter associated 
with this variable is highly significant and posi-
tive in sign. We find that a one percent increase 
(decrease) in the national-level fixed interest rate 
on mortgages two months ago translates into a 
2.71 percent increase (decrease) in the mort-
gage delinquency rate during the current month. 
Somehow, surprisingly, we cannot establish any 
significant statistical relationship between the 
national-level variable interest rate on mortgages 
and the county-level mortgage delinquency rate. 
We put forward the hypothesis that the local real 
estate market, while moving along with national 
trends of ballooning activity between 2003 and 
2007, did not share the “bubble” qualities associ-
ated with large volumes of adjustable-rate mort-
gages prevalent in other areas. Therefore, only a 
small fraction of local homeowners was exposed 
to the variable financing costs brought about by 
these financial instruments. Lastly, Model D exam-
ines the relationship between the county-level 
mortgage delinquency rate and regional-level 
fixed and variable interest rates. For the same rea-
sons discussed above, we lag this variable by two 
(2) periods. The regression parameter associated 
with this variable is highly significant and positive 
in sign. We find that a one percent increase (de-
crease) in the regional-level fixed interest rate on 
mortgages two months ago translates into a 2.27 
percent increase (decrease) in the mortgage de-
linquency rate during the current month. Again, 
we cannot establish any significant statistical re-
lationship between the variable interest rate on 
mortgages and the mortgage delinquency rate, 
even though in this case we consider regional-
level variable interest rates. We will refer the 
reader to the argument we put forward above. 
The explanatory power of our linear regression 
efforts focused on financial market factors yield 
very similar R-squares: we explain (on average) 
21 percent of the variance in the rate of growth 
of the delinquency rate. The residual diagnostics 
yield mixed results. Although we can strongly re-
ject the null hypothesis of heteroskedasticity in the 
residuals, we cannot conclude definitely that the 
regression residuals are not autocorrelated or that 
they are normally distributed.
 Our final estimation effort combines labor 
and financial market factors. Besides the one-pe-
riod lagged value of the growth rate in the mort-
gage delinquency rate and the event dummy dis-
cussed above we include the growth rates in the 
regional fixed interest rate on mortgages and in 
the area-level number of unemployed. As before, 
we lag these variables in order to capture the de-
lay in the reaction of the mortgage delinquency 
rate that follows a change in both labor market 
and mortgage financing conditions. The regres-
sion parameters associated with these variables 
are highly significant and positive in sign. We note 
that when considered simultaneously the magni-
tude of the parameter linking the number of un-
employed with the mortgage delinquency rate 
increases (by 2.33 percent) while the magnitude 
of the parameter linking the fixed interest rate on 
mortgages with the mortgage delinquency rate 
decreases (by 17.66 percent). Nevertheless, the 
impact of changes in financial factors is 2.38 times 
larger than the impact of changes in labor market 
factors. In fact, a 10 percent increase (decrease) 
in the fixed interest rate on mortgages translates 
into an 18.69 percent increase (decrease) in the 
mortgage delinquency rate, while a 10 percent 
increase (decrease) in the number of unem-
ployed individuals translates into a 7.85 percent 
increase (decrease) in the mortgage delinquen-
cy rate. This regression yields the highest R-square 
of all of our models: we are able to explain 24 per-
cent of the variance in the rate of growth of the 
delinquency rate. Finally, the residual diagnostics 
yield mixed results. Although we can strongly re-
ject the null hypothesis of heteroskedasticity in the 
residuals, we cannot conclude definitely that the 
regression residuals are not autocorrelated or that 
they are normally distributed.
IV. CONCLUSION
 Our study of the behavior of the mortgage 
delinquency rate in McLean County, IL attempts 
to explain it as a function of several different fac-
tors. We consider, independently and jointly, labor 
market indicators such as the number of unem-
ployed and the unemployment rate and financial 
market indicators such as the 30-year fixed and 
1-year variable mortgage interest rates. Both na-
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tional-level and regional-level mortgage interest 
rates are, alternatively, examined as potential ex-
planatory variables. We find that the OLS regres-
sion yielding the best overall fit is capable of ex-
plaining 24 percent of the variance in the growth 
rate of the mortgage delinquency rate over time. 
More importantly, we find that when the number 
of unemployed individuals or the fixed mortgage 
interest rate change, even by the same percent-
age amount, the reaction of the mortgage de-
linquency rate is remarkably different in terms of 
order of magnitude. In our sample period the im-
pact of changes in financial factors on the coun-
ty-level mortgage delinquency rate is 2.38 times 
larger than the impact of changes in labor mar-
ket factors.
 This empirical finding is potentially useful to 
address an ongoing local debate on whether it 
is the job losses associated with the latest reces-
sion or the onerous financing terms of properties 
suddenly devalued by the collapse of the real es-
tate market that is resulting in larger numbers of 
mortgage defaults and, eventually, foreclosures. 
Our conclusion that financial market indicators 
play a larger role than labor market indicators 
could help focus the policy responses to the on-
going problem of property foreclosures. We will 
argue that policy efforts in this area should em-
phasize loss-mitigation (i.e. refinancing) instead of 
job-creation. In that light, we are happy to report 
that a lender-borrower mediation process has 
been recently implemented as part of the legal 
foreclosure proceedings in the local court sys-
tem. On the other hand, our research leads us to 
believe that recent reductions in the unemploy-
ment rate, both at the national and local levels, 
would not have as much of a dampening effect 
on the number of county-level mortgage defaults 
as many would expect. Finally, we will point out 
the fact that although local and regional policy-
makers may be able to influence, to a degree, 
labor market conditions in the area their degree 
of influence over financial market conditions is se-
verely constrained. In other words, regulation and 
control of financial market conditions is mostly 
conducted at the national level, where local and 
regional interests and priorities are multiple and 
often conflicting.
 In terms of potential avenues of future re-
search we propose to study the time series char-
acteristics of the fillings of lis pendens notices by 
themselves. A visual examination of this series 
seems to indicate a semi-continuous process: a 
month with a relatively high number of lis pendens 
notices filed is frequently followed by a month 
with a relatively low number of lis pendens notices 
filed. The resulting seesaw plot of the series may 
provide a clue regarding the prevalent rejection 
of the null hypothesis of autocorrelation in the 
regression residuals. A potential manipulation of 
these series through some sort of moving average 
or filtering process could merit future research ef-
forts.
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Fig. 1. Histogram of Delinquency Rate and 12-Month Moving Average
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Fig. 3. Histogram of Regional and National 1-Year Variable Mortgage Interest Rates
Fig. 4. Histogram of Bloomington-Normal Metropolitan Unemployment Rate
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Table 1: Results of the ADF Test for Unit Roots
Constant+trend Significance
Variables in logarithms
The null hypothesis is non-stationarity 
Delinquency rate -3.8881 **
Unemployment rate -2.3174
Unemployed -2.2151
Fixed interest rate, regional -3.2723 *
Fixed interest rate, national -3.2888 *
Variable interest rate, regional -1.5903
Variable interest rate, national -1.7320
Critical values (%)
1 -3.9875
5 -3.4242
10 -3.1351  
Variables in logarithms and first order 
differences
The null hypothesis is non-stationarity 
Delinquency rate -11.18235 ***
Unemployment rate -3.6219 **
Unemployed -3.8281 **
Fixed interest rate, regional -12.8864 ***
Fixed interest rate, national -12.8054 ***
Variable interest rate, regional -14.8323 ***
Variable interest rate, national -10.3244 ***
Critical values (%)
1 -3.9875
5 -3.4242
10 -3.1351  
Fig. 5. Histogram of Number of Unemployment Individuals in the 
Bloomington-Normal Metropolitan
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Table 2: Results of the KPSS Test for Stationarity
 Constant+trend Significance
Variables in logarithms
The null hypothesis is stationarity
Delinquency rate 0.3899
Unemployment rate 0.3755
Unemployed 0.3714
Fixed interest rate, regional 0.0765 ***
Fixed interest rate, national 0.0706 ***
Variable interest rate, regional 0.0859 ***
Variable interest rate, national 0.0836 ***
Critical values (%)
1 0.2160
5 0.1460
10 0.1190  
Variables in logarithms and first order 
differences
The null hypothesis is stationarity
Delinquency rate 0.1223 **
Unemployment rate 0.0926 ***
Unemployed 0.1076 ***
Fixed interest rate, regional 0.0514 ***
Fixed interest rate, national 0.0485 ***
Variable interest rate, regional 0.0924 ***
Variable interest rate, national 0.0845 ***
Critical values (%)
1 0.2160
5 0.1460
10 0.1190  
Table 3: Estimation Results Model A And Model B
Dependent variable: % D in the Delinquency Rate (t=0)
n = 259
 Model A Model B
 
Constant 0.0139 0.0132
(0.4606) (0.4375)
% D in Delinquency Rate -0.3637*** -0.3628***
 (t - 1) (-6.6027) (-6.5951)
% D in Unemployed Population 0.7675***
 (t - 4) (2.7845)
 
% D in Unemployment Rate 0.7022***
 (t - 4) (2.6791)
 
Dummy variable -2.6546*** -2.6737***
 (January 1992) (-5.4579) (-5.5040)
 
R-squared 0.2292 0.2309
P (F-stat) 0.0000 0.0000
Residual Diagnostic Tests, P-values
White’s test (heteroskedasticity) 0.0960 0.0741
Breusch-Godfrey (autocorrelation) 0.0000 0.0000
Jarque-Bera (normality) 0.0158 0.0145
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Table 4: Estimation Results Model C and Model D
Dependent variable: % D in the Delinquency Rate (t = 0)
n = 305
 Model C Model D
Constant 0.0258 0.0223
 (0.8340) (0.7287)
% D in Delinquency Rate -0.3888*** -0.3853***
 (t - 1) (-7.5430) (-7.5220)
 
% D in National Fixed Interest Rate 2.7128***
 (t - 2) (2.6631)
 
% D in National Variable Interest Rate 1.0225
 (t - 3) (0.8562)
 
% D in Regional Fixed Interest Rate 2.2710***
 (t - 2) (2.1401)
 
% D in Regional Variable Interest Rate 1.1483
 (t -1) (1.0855)
Dummy variable -2.6319*** -2.620***
 (January 1992) (-4.9260) (-4.9016)
R-squared 0.2176 0.2161
P (F-stat) 0.0000 0.0000
Residual Diagnostic Tests, P-values
White’s test (heteroskedasticity) 0.1784 0.1893
Breusch-Godfrey (autocorrelation) 0.0000 0.0000
Jarque-Bera (normality) 0.0000 0.0000
Table 5: Regression Result for Model E
Dependent variable: % D in Delinquency Rate (t = 0)
n = 259
 Model E
Constant 0.1963
 (0.6506)
% D in Delinquency Rate -0.3709***
 (t - 1) (-6.7568)
% D in Regional Fixed Interest rate 1.8698**
 (t - 3) (1.9049)
% D in Number of Unemployed 0.7854***
 (t - 4) (2.8624)
 
Dummy variable -2.6450***
 (January 1992) (-5.4704)
R-squared 0.2417
P (F-stat) 0.000
Residual Diagnostic Tests, P-values
White’s test (heteroskedasticity) 0.0703
Breusch-Godfrey (autocorrelation) 0.0000
Jarque-Bera (normality) 0.0075
